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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC., a
Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
RAEDEL E. ASHLEY, et al,
Defendants-Appellees.
GARY MONTGOMERY, et al,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
JOHN DOE 1-5, et al,
Defendants-Appellees, and

Case No.
12123

GRAND CENTRAL, INC., a corporation,
Intervenor,
GARY MONTGOMERY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
A. B. COOPER, dba KEARNS IGA
FOODLINER, et al,
Defendants-Appellees
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC.
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third District Court
In and For Salt Lake County, Utah
The Honorable Leonard W. Elton, Presiding
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC., a
Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
HAEDEL E. ASHLEY, et al,
Defendants-A ppellees.
GARY MONTGOMERY, et al,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VS.

JOHN DOE 1-5, et al,
Defendants-Appellees, and

Case No.
12123

GRAND CENTRAL, INC., a corporation,
Intervenor,
G,\RY MONTGOMERY,
VS.

Plaintiff-Appellant,

A. B. COOPER, dba KEARNS IGA
FOODLINER, et al,
Defendants-Appellees

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a consolidation of three actions brought in
the District Court of Salt Lake County under Chapter
23, Laws of Utah 1970, commonly referred to as the
"Common Duy of Rest Act" (the "Aet"). Case No.
1

192780 brought by plaintiff Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc.
against defendant individuals and corporations operating licensed pharmacies in Salt Lake County, seeks a
temporary and permanent injunction restraining said
defendants from violating the Common Day of Rest Act
and damages against defendants for violating said Act
during the pendency of the action. Case No. 192886 was
brought by planitiffs Gary Montgomery, Alan K. J eppesen, Richard Harrington, Henry Skidmore, Gary L.
Paxton and Larry R. Keller, as private individuals, and
Case No. 192948 was brought by Gary Montgomery, as
a private individual, against defendants operating places
of business in Salt Lake County. These two cases seek
a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from
violating the Act.
DISPOSI'rION IN LOWER COURT
In a consolidated hearing limited to the question of
constitutionality, Judge Leonard W. Elton, in a decision
from the bench on J\fay 12, 1970, held that Utah's Common Day of Rest Act, Chapter 25, Laws of Utah 1970
was, in its entirety, in violation of the provisions of the
Constitution of Utah. In an Order of Dismissal entered
May 18, 1970, def end ants' various Motions for Dismissal
and Motions for Summary Judgment were granted and
the consolidated actions were dismissed with prejudice.
RELIEF' SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek to have the judgment of the lower
court reversed and the Common Day of Rest Act de·
clared constitutional.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Immediately prior to the hearing below, all parties
hereto, both plaintiffs and defendants, stipulated in open
court that the question of constitutionality was ripe for
decision.
The facts are not in dispute. The only facts before
the court \Yere stipulated between all the parties hereto,
which stipulation has been included in the Record on
Appeal.
On Sunday, April 5, 1970, in Case No. 192780, indi\'icluals shopped and made purchases at stores named as
clefendants, all of which were open to the public and concluded and operated in the usual manner and location.
Defendants are all individuals or corporations operating
businesses for profit, containing a licensed pharmacy on
the premises and selling items at retail to members of
the public in competition with the business operated by
plaintiff Skaggs.
On Sunday, April 5, 1970, in Case No. 192886 the
individual plaintiffs shopped at defendant stores and
made purchases named in that complaint. None of the
stores so named had filed a notice of intent to remain
closed on Saturday.
On Sunday, April 12, 1970, in Case No. 192948 indiYiclual plaintiff Montgomery, shopped at defendant
stores and made purchases named in tha.t complaint.
None of the stores so named had filed a notice of intent
to close 011 Saturday.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
CREATING A COMMON DAY FOR REST
AND RECREATION IS A PROPER LEGISLATIVE EXERCISE OF THE P 0 LICE
PO-WFJR AND DOES NOT CONrPRAVENE
FIRST AJ\.LENDMENT PROTECTIONS OF
FREEDOM OR ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION.
Cessation of normal commercial activities on Sunday, by legislation or executive fiat, has a lengthy and
broad history. Beginning as a Christian edict, Exodus
20 :8-11, 23 :12, Rl :12-17; Deuteronomy 5 :12-15; perpetuated as a God-fearing rule by secular leaders, Gallagher
v. Crown-Kosher Super Ma.rket, 36G U.S. 617, 625, G
L.Ed.2d 536, 541, 81 S.Ct. 1122 (1961) quoting a 1671
pronouncement of the Plymouth Colony; it has been implemented throughout the ages until now some form of
Sunday closing exists in 49 of the 50 statt>s, McG011 au
v. 111arylarnd, 366 U.S. 420, 495, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 81 S.Ct.
1101 (1961) (Frankfurter's separate opinion; see also
Appendix II thereto).
1

Like Christmas, Easter and many other customs and
traditions which were essentially religious in origin,
Sunday has remained a special day, but essentially for
secular purposes: for rest and relaxation, for visiting
family and friends, for recreation and playing.
That a state may t>iiact a common clay of rest as a
valid exercise of the police power has been recoguizell
by the Supreme Courts of Utah and of the United Statet>.
4

As early as 1903 the Supreme Court of Utah recognized
the validity of Sunday closing laws:
General laws prohibiting the transaction of
business on the first day of the week, commonly
Sunday, are so uniformly upheld by the
courts as a legitimate exercise of the police power
of the state that it is unnecessary to cite or discuss authority in support thereof.

*
*
*
In Cooley, Const.Lim.
the author says
on Sunday laws: 'There can no longer be any
question, if there ever was, that such laws may
be supported as regulations of police. State v.
Sopher, 25 Utah 318, 71 Pac. 482 (1903).
In 1943 Chief .Justice ·wolfe in Broadbent v. Gibson,
100 Utah 53, 140 P.2d 939, 943, stated that:
The constitutionality of general Sunday closing la·ws, which have been enacted in nearly every
state, is no longer to be doubted. Such statutes
have been uniformly upheld. (Cites omitted.)
*
*
*
Although these statutes had their origin in
religions obsenance of the Sabbath, they are not
now to be so regarded. Their purpose is to protect socidy by establishing a compulsory day of
rest.
F·iee also Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah 284, 194

P.2cl 464, 466.

Characterizing Sunday closing laws as a valid exercise of the police power, .Justice Frankfurter stated:
Throughout this century and longer, both the
federal and state governments have oriented their
5

activities very largely toward improvement of the
health, safety, recreation and general well-being
of our citizens. Numerous laws affecting public
health, safety factors in industry, laws affecting
hours and conditions of labor of women and children, week-end diversion at parks and beaches,
and cultural activities of various kinds, now point
the way toward the good life for all. Sunday Closing Laws, like those before us, have become part
and parcel of this great governmental concern
wholly apart from their original purposes or
connotations. The present purpose and effect of
most of them is to provide a uniform day of rest
for all citizens; the fact that this day is Sunday,
a day of particular significance for the dominant
Christian sects, does not bar the Sta:tes from
achieving its secular goals. To say that the States
cannot prescribe Sunday as a day of rest for these
purposes solely because centuries ago such laws
had their genesis in religion would give a constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public
welfare rather than one of more separation of
church and State. McGowan, supra, at 444-445.
Despite the wide discretion a legislature has in acting within an area which the courts have m1equivocally
held to be a valid exercise of the police power for creating a day in which an atmosphere of diversion for rest
and recreation is established, the citizenry and the courts
are understandably sensitive because that day is Sunday,
a day which in this nation and particularly in this State
has religious connotations.
In 1961, the United States Supreme Court was directly confronted with a First Amendment attack on Sunday
closing laws. They held, in an eight to one decision in
6

McGowan v. Maryla/J'bd, supra, at 449, the major case in
a senes of cases sustaining Sunday closing legislation,
that:
The statutes' present purpose and effect is
not to aid religion but to set aside a day of rest
and recreation.
Despite religious language in the statutes, such as
referring to Sunday as the "Lord's Day" and the "Sabbath,'' the Supreme Court held that the purpose and
effect of common day of rest statutes was secular:
" ... vVe believe that the aim of the day is one of relaxation rather than religion," McGowan v. Maryland, supra,
at 448. " . . . We do no:t find that the present statutes'
purpose or effect is religious,'' Gallagher, supra, at 630.
'' ... '\Ve hold that neither the statute's purpose nor its
effect is religious," Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown
v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 598, 6 L.Ed.2d 551, 561, 81
S.Ct. 1135 (1961), reh. den. 368 U.S. 869, 82 S.Ct. 21,
7 L.Ecl.2d 69.
It has been contended that the Saturday option
( ?5 ( 5)) is a discriminatory religious preference as a
direct aid to religion and therefore violate·s the First
Amendment. It is true that the Saturday option will
alleviate an economic burden from those businesses which
must close on Saturday because of religious dictates.
But it cannot be said as a matter of logic or common
sense that by deleting a possible religious discrimination
the State is thereby aiding and preferring religion. Anyone covered by the Utah act may elect the option, for
whatever reason. The mom and pop neighborhood gro7

cery store may elect to close on Saturday as may the
Kosher delicatessen. That section is complied with by the
ministerial act of filing, without fee, a notice of intent
to close on Saturday.
The United States Supreme Court in Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 L.Ed.2d 563, 81 S.Ct. 1144 (1961)
held that a Sunday closing law was constitutional without a Saturday option but that ''a number of States
provide such an exemption, and this may well be the
wiser solution to the problem" at 608.
POINT II
WHEN THE ACT IS INTERPRETED IN
LIGHT OF ITS PURPOSE IT APPLIES
UNIFORMLY TO ALL AND IS NOT UNCONsrrITUTIONALLY VAGUE.
The purpose of ,the Act is to establish a common day
of rest as a diversion from the customary labors of the
work-a-day world to a change of pace for rest and recreational activity. The Act asserts this as its purpose and
it is not competent for this or any other court to assume
another and possibly unconstitutional purpose.
Rest and recreation is clearly an important public
purpose and should be endorsed and the means chosen by
the Legislature to promote this purpose should be upheld even though enforced rest or recreation for all citizens at the same time is neither required nor desirable.
In our complex and interdependent society a total cessation of commercial and business activity at any time is
8

hoth impossihk and undesirable. Hence, some forms of
activities arnl sen-ices must be excluded from coverage.
Arnl this raises questions of equal protection and due
process. But the courts recognize that legislatures do not
act in a vacuum; they do not require that legislatures
erca te rules based on neat and tidy abstract logical constrnets which collapse when the realities of life are injected into them. As Frankfurter stated in McGowan,
supra, at 524:
N cit her the Due Process nor the Equal Protection Clause demands logical tidiness . . . No
finicky or exact conformity to abstract correlation
is required of legislation. The Constitution is
:-;a tis fie cl if a legislature responds to the practical
living facts with which it deals. Through what
precise points in a field of many competing pressure a legislature might most suitably have drawn
its lines is not a question for judicial re-examination. It is enough to satisfy the Constitution that
in drafting them the principle of reason has not
been clisrcgn rel ed.
In addition to the United States Constitution, Article
I, §24 and Article VI, §26 of the Utah Constitution are
regarded as requiring equal protection of laws. These
provisions of the Utah Constitution are construed together and are violated if a statute creates "an unreasonable classification, resulting in a failure of uniform applicaiton of the general law," Abrahamsen v.
Hoard of Reriew of Industrial Commission, 3 U.2d 289,
215 ( 1955). Under the Act there is a dis283 P .2c1
('rimina tory treatment in the sale of goods in that some
classes are exempted from compulsory closing. Equal
9

protection of laws does not prevent classification and
discrimination in legislative treatment of a subject. All
that is required is that there be "a reasonable basis to
differentiate those included from those excluded," Entre
Nou.s Club v. Toronfo,4 U.2d 98, 287 P.2d 670, 674 (1955).
In determining reasonableness the court does not
make a policy judgment as to the wisdom of the legislation, Broadbent v. Gibson,, supra, at 944, and will invalidate legislation only if the classifications and discrimination are unreasonable and arbitrary, State v. Mason, 94
Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920, 117 A.L.R. 330, 333 (1938). Legislation passes that test so long as there is ''some basis''
that "bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to he
accomplished by the Act,'' Ibid.
This court, in Broadbent v. Gibson·, supra, at 944
established the following standard for equal protection:
In determining whether or not this classification is unconstitutional, it must be remembered
that discrimination is the very essence of classification and is not objectionable unless founded upon distinctions which the court is compelled to find
unreasonable. (Cites omitted.) The legislature
has a wide discretion in determining what shall
come within the class of permitted activities and
what shall be excluded. (Cites omitted.)
A court is not concerned with the wisdom or
policy of the law and cannot substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body. If reasonable minds might differ as to the reasonableness
of the regulation, the law must be upheld.
This standard was also expressly adopted in Gronlund
v. Salt Lake City, supra, at 466.
10

The classifications in the Utah statute are founded
upon a rational basis and apply uniformly to all. The
exemptions are based on classifications of commodities,
not types of businesses. Thus, the exempted items may
be sold by anyone, at any time, on any day. As Justice
Wolfe sfated, "This type of statute is almost uniformly
upheld," Broadbent, supra at 467.

Gronlund offers no clue as to how that exemption
should be worded, but some clue is provided in Broadbent, supra, at 945-946:
Unless such an implied exemption [for works
of necessity] were read into the act none of the
exempted businesses could sell sick room supplies
other than compounded medicines. There are
other business activities involving the sale of
items necessa,ry to the maintenarnce of life and
health which are not specifically exempted from
the general closing provision, yet the legislature
cannot under such a statute constitutionally prohibit the sale of such items. (emphasis added).
Despite the fact that the phrase "works of necessity" has been constitutionally upheld in other sit.ates,
Berta v. Georgia, 154 So. 2d 594 (Ga. 1967), Opinion of
the Justices, 229 A.2d 188 (N.H., 1967), State v. Solomon,
141 S.E.2d 818 (S.C., 1965), State v. Gates, 141 S.E.2d
369 (W.Va. 1965), Arlan·'s Department Store v. State,
369 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1963), the Utah Legislature chose to
be more specific by following the implication of Broadbent and exempted:
The sale of goods or rendering of services
necessary to the maintenance of health, safety
11

and life, such as, by way of example and not by
way of limitatio11, medical or hospital goods or
services and prescription medicine.
There are also activities which, of inherent necessity,
cannot, in this complex, inter-dependent society in which
we live, ever he interrupted or halted without disastrous
consequences: transportation and communication facilities, public utilities and privately owned plants which by
their nature require continuous operation. The existence
of exemptions does not violate constitutional guarantees
of equal protection, McGowan, supra, at 427. \:Vho would
argue that on Sunday there should he no electricity or
telephone service, or that airplanes shouldn't land in
Utah or that blast furnaces (which take days to heat)
should be shut
It would seem that the Legislature
could find that there was a reasonable basis on which to
exempt this class-at least facts may be conceived to
justify i1t, McGown, supra, at 426, or reasonable minds
might so believe, Broadbent, supra, at 944-and the class,
by definition, provides equal treatment to those similarly
situated.
People traveling through the state compose a reasonable class for exemption because they, by necessity, require certain goods and services to travel. rrheir activities in the state are subject to the same standards as
Utah citizens; only goods and services essential to travel
-the characteristic which distinguishes them and makes
them a class-are exempt.

12

It is a proper purpose of a common day of rest act
to facilitate certain activities, McGowarn, supra, at 426.
"By 'rest' was not meant inaction. It was recognized
that in this modern age recreation or change of activity
is a form of rest,'' Broadbent, supra, at 945. The exemptions of goods and services normally associated \vith or
incidental to the operation of recreational, educaitional
or entertainment facilities emphasize the secular purposes of a common day of rest by facilitating recreational
diversion from one's normal labors.
The classifications of the Maryland statute which
was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
McGowan, seem capricious and discriminatory when compared to the Utah Act. See Appendix to the opinion in
JlcGowan, supra., at 453, et seq. The Maryland statute
exempts retail outlets employing not more than one per;.;ou other than the owner,
Ann. Code, Art. 27,
';J21(b), while the Utah statute exempts anyone who sells
exe>mpted items or renders exempted services. The Maryland statute exempts the sale of alcoholic beverages in
some counties, at some hours during the day, by some
types of licensees in some districts, Maryland Ann. Code,
Art. 2B,
(a) (2) and (3),
(A) (1) ancl (2), (b)
(1) and 2), while the Utah statute uniformly exempts
the sale of all beverages, by anyone, anywhere, at any
time of tbe day. The l\Iaryland statute also permitted a
differential treatment of the same activities between
different counties of the state, at different hours of the
day and at different distances from churches where religious services were being held, McGowan, supra, at 424.

13

The categories of the Pennsylvania statutes seem arbitrary and unreasonable in light of the Utah Act. For
example:
The Sunday exhibition of motion pictures is
permitted only after 2 p.m., and then only if the
voters in each muncipality approve; however, religious motion pictures may be shown by churches
at any time providing they are shown within
church property and no admission price is charged. Baseball, football and polo receive similar
treaitment except the permitted hours are between
1 p.m. and 7 p.m. Public concerts, of music of high
order though not necessarily sacred, may only be
performed after noon. Two Guys From HarrisonAllentown v. McGinley, supra, at 586.
Indeed, when compared to the state statutes at issue
in the 1961 Sunday closing cases, the Utah Act is model
legislation in clarity and rationality.
It has been contended that because the Utah constitutional provisions for equal protection are worded
differently from the federal constitutional requirement,
that something niore is required by our Constitution. No
case law has been found to substantiate this claim. Indeed, Justice Wolfe in Broadbent v. Gibson, supra, cites
the United States Supreme Court caHe of Nebbia 1'. Neu'
York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R.
1469 (1934) in his discussion of due process and equal
protection standards to be applied to Sunday closing
legislation. That landmark case, sustaining a state's
right to set minimum prices in the sale of retail milk,
held that the court will not examine the wisdom of the
policy established by tlw Legislature, Id. at 537; that the
14

standard ''demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained," Id. at 525. The Utah Supreme Court, by its reliance on N ebbia., has adopted at
least for Sunday closing cases, the same approach to
equal protection and due process problems as the United
States Supreme Court-an approach which renders the
1961 Sunday closing cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court highly persuasive authority, if not controlling, to the questions at hand under the Utah Constitution.
The contention that this court should, in interpreting
Article I, 024 and Article VI, 026 of the Utah Constitution, make a determination as to the wisdom of the legislation, has serious constitutional infirmities (separation
of powers) and constitute a departure from established
judicial policy. If such a rule were adopted in this case
it would compel the court, in all cases wherein the questions of equal protection were raised, to act as the final
arbiter of legislative wisdom and policy. Substantive due
process as a method of substituting the court's judgment
for the judgment of the legislature was discredited by
the United States Supreme Court in the 1930's. Such
judicial substitution of judgment has not been the policy
of this court and, it is submitted, should not now be
adopted.
It may he that reasonable minds may differ as to the
wisdom of the particular classifications in the Act at
hand. But it cannot be said that those classifications do
15

not bear <t reasonable relation to the legislative creation
of a common clay of rest.
The Utah Act is different from almost all other Sunday closing legislation in that it is not a criminal statute.
'l1he sole enforcement is through the civil remedy of injunctive relief. This distinction is Yital. -While the Act,
like any legislation, must 11ot be so vague that it violates
due process standards, it is not subject to the more stringent void-for-vagueness test applied to criminal statutes.
The protections of due process of law under the Utah
and United States Constitutions are substantially similar. The language is the same and the United States
Supreme Court decisions are highly persuasiYe of the
interpretation of the Utah provisions, Untermyer v.
State Tax Commission, 102 Utah 214, 129 P.2d 881, 885
(1942). In the 1961 Sunday closing cases, all of which
dealt with criminal statutes, the Supreme Court dispelled
all due process argumeuts.
The Utah Act, unlike a statute which establishes
criminal sanctions for viola ti on, does not provide any
penalty for violation until after one disobeys an injunction issued against him by a court. And before that injunction can issue the defendant must have a court
hearing in ·which he has a fnll opportunity to explain and
justify all the facts arnl circumstances surrounding the
incident complained of. It is only after an injunction is
issued and tlw defendant 1;iolates that injunction, that
punative action can he taken. 'I'hat decision will he made
by the exercise of souncl discretion by a court after a full
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understanding of the f a ct u a 1 situation, not by the
mechanical application of rigid labels.

It is possible and even enticing to conjure up ad
absurdum specific incidents of commercial activity to
argue whether they come within this or that phrase of
the Act. After such an exercise the Act seems a hodgepodge of unrelated, illogical, dissonant inclusions and exdusions. But the Act cannot be read phrase-by-phrase,
·word-by-word. Rather, it, like any other statute, must
be read and interpreted as an interrelated whole, guided
l)y the legislative purpose it seeks to accomplish and the
Jicta tes of common sense.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we respectfully submit
that the Common Day of Rest Act is in all respects valid
and constitutional. To arri,,e at this result the court need
not and should not indulge in philosophical speculations
as to the desirability of this type of legislation. That
·rnlne and policy decision has heretofore been made
through the due course of legislative action. Plaintiffs
therefore request this Court to reverse the order of the
lower court and to remand these cases for further interpretive proceedings consistent with this declaration.
Respectfully submitted,
H. R. Waldo, Jr. and
Jack Lunt of
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
& McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc.
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APPENDIX
CHAPTER 25, LAWS OF UTAH 1970
H. B. No. 8 (Passed January 31, 1970. In effect April 2,
1970)
SUNDAY CLOSING

An Act Relating to the Establishment of Sunday as a
Day of Rest; Providing for a General Prohibition
Against the Performance of Labor or Selling on
Sunday, For Exemptions From Such Prohibition,
and For Definitions and Penalties; and Repealing
Sections 76-55-1, 76-55-2 and 76-55-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Purpose of Act.
The legislature finds that Sunday has come to have
special significance in the state of Utah and throughout
the United States as a day of relaxation, entertainment,
family activity and diversion from customary labors.
Children and parents may be at home together on this
day, there being traditionally no school in session and no
general conduct of labor or business in the state. In rerent times there has been an increase in the general
conduct of labor and business throughout the state on
Sunday. The restriction of this tendency and the promotion of a uniform day of diversion and relaxation on the
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day established by custom are determined to be legitimate subjects for regulation. This determination is based
upon the legislature's finding that it is socially desirable
to promote weekly rest from the routine of daily affairs
and to promote family and social relaxation and entertainment on a uniform day. The legislature also finds it to
be necessary in fulfillment of and consistent with these
purposes to permit the conduct of certain labor and the
sale of certain goods or services which are vital to the
maintenance of basic functions of the rommunity or
which are necessary for tlw existence of facilities for
diversion, rerrea ti on or re lax a ti on. In addition, the
legislature recognizes that some citizens of the state observe Saturday as the Sabbath and should not be unjustly
affected by a common day of rest act. Because of thr
difficulties inherent in determining the good faith of religious belief or practice, it is deemed reasonable to
eliminate the risk of such injustire by excepting from the
general operation of such an act those who do not engage
in their daily labors on Saturday. The legislature finds
that the number of such persons or persons who would
close their businesses on Saturday in order to he open on
Sunday is small enough in this state that this exception
does not impair the purposes of a uniform day of rest.
Section 2. Act to be liberally construed.
rrhis act shall be liberally construed to carry out the
objects and purposes and the derlarcd policy of the state
of Utah as in this act set forth.
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Section 3. Definitions.
As used in this act: ( 1) The words "Sunday" and
''Saturday'' mean that period of time between midnight
at the beginning of such calendar day and the following
midnight; (2) The phrases "business or labor for profit"
and ''operate a place of business'' mean the rendering of
services, performance of labor, or sale of goods as a
primary vocational activity for consideration, and exclude:
(a) Labors of necessity voluntarily performed by
one ·whose activity does not require his contract with the
public;
(b) The activities of enterprises conducted solely
for charitable or religious purposes;
( c) The activities of federal, state, municipal or
local governmental departments or agencies, or their
employees, acting in an official capacity;
( d) Activities engaged in for extraordinary purposes of an emergency nature; and,
( e) Isolated or occasional sales by persons not
customarily engaged in the business of selling the goods
or rendering the services concerned.
Section 4. Activities decrned unlawful.
Sunday is hereby established as a day of diversion
and relaxation in the state of Utah. Except as hereafter
provided, it shall be unlawful on Sunday for any person,
firm or corporation:
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(1) To engage in or conduct business or labor for
profit in the usual manner and location, or to operate a
place of business open to the public; or

(2) To cause, direct or require any employee or
agent to engage in or conduct business or labor for profit
in the usual manner and location, or to operate a place
of business open to the public.
Section 5. Exceptions.
The provisions of the preceding section shall not
apply to:
( 1) The sale of goods or rendering of services neces-

sary to the maintenance of health, safety and life, such
as, by way of example and not by way of limitation,
medical or hospital goods or services and prescription
medicine.
( 2) The sale of goods or rendering of services essential or incidental to operations which are customarily
continuous, seasonally or otherwise, such as airlines, railroads, taxicabs, bnslines or other transportation facilities: telephone, radio, television, or other communications
facilities; po'.ver or water supplies and facilities or other
public utilities; the extraction or processing of natural
resources; manufacturing, processing or assembly plants
whose equipment or processes require continuous operation.
( 3) The sale of goods or rcnch•ring of services esse11tia l to travel by persons within or through the state, such
as the rental of rooms or other li\'ing accommodations;
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sales of motor fuels and supplies or services customarily
provided by automotive service stations; or sales of food
or drink prepared for consumption on the premises
where sold.
( 4) The sale of goods or rendering of services normally associated with or incidental to the operation of
recreational, educational or entertainment facilities, such
as newspapers or periodicals; beverages, tobacco
products and confections; maintaining theatres, resorts,
golf courses, libraries, educational forums, scenic and
tourist attractions.
( 5) Persons, firms or corporations, who or which:
(a) Neither conduct nor require the conducting by
others of any business or labor for profit on Saturday,
Pither by themselves or through firms or corporations
under their ownership or control; and
(b) File, without filing fee, a notice of intent to
cease doing business on Saturday, specifying the owners
of such business and the locations where such business
or labor is conducted, with the county clerk in each county
where such person, firm or corporation conducts its
business.
Section 6. Violation of act deemed public nuisance.
The purpose of this act is to promote the health,
recreation and welfare of the people of the state of Utah.
Any violation of this act shall not be deemed a crime but
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is declared to be a public nuisance, and any person or
county attorney may apply to any court of competent
jurisdiction for, and may obtain, an injunction restraining such violation.
Section 7. Severability clause.
If any provision of this act or the application of any
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid,
the remainder of this act shall not be affected thereby.

Section 8. Sale of motor vehicles.
This act applies to the sale of motor vehicles except
as provided in sections 76-55-5, 76-55-6 and 76-55-7.
Section 9. Sections repealed.
Sections 76-55-1, 76-55-2 and 76-55-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are hereby repealed.
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